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BOOK REVIEW
Framing the Public Square
GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS.

By

Stephen L. Carter.* Basic Books, 2000. Pp. 256. $15.00 (Paperback).
JAY

D.

WEXLER**
INTRODUCTION

For at least the past decade or so, law-and-religion scholars have vigorously
debated the issue of whether it is proper for American citizens to rely on
religious reasons when talking about and reaching decisions on issues of public
concern, including law.1 Those who argue that religion should be kept out of
such decisionmaking and discourse contend that reliance on religious reasons:
(1) violates principles of separation of church and state,2 (2) unfairly excludes

* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
** Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author thanks Nancy Moore, Trevor
Morrison, and Rusty Park for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I. For a sampling of this literature, see generally KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND
PUBLIC REASONS (1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]; KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS];
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); Robert
Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 259 (1989); Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role
of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J. L. & REL. 1 (1994);
Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J. L. & REL. 325, 332 (1984);
Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535
[hereinafter Is Religion Special?]; Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses,
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993) [hereinafter The Political Balance]; Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as
Interpretation:A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
337; Robin W. Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1517 (1989);
William W. Park, Spiritual Energy and Secular Power, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171-221 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991); Richard Rorty, Religion
as Conversation-Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the
Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998);
Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631 (1999); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, God as a Lobby, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655 (1994); Symposium, Religiously Based
Morality: Its Proper Place in American Law and Public Policy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217
(2001); Symposium, The Religious Voice in the Public Square, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1401 (1996);
Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 642
(1993); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747
(1993).
2. See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 677, 687-99 (1993) [hereinafter The Place of Religious Argument]; Audi, supra note I,
at 278-86 (arguing that citizens should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions
on human conduct unless the citizens also are willing to offer and are motivated by an adequate secular
reason).
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nonbelievers from meaningful participation in public discourse, 3 (3) creates
unacceptable divisiveness, 4 and (4) risks the domination of Christian beliefs in
public discourse to the detriment of religious minorities. 5 Those who disagree
say reliance is proper for several reasons; they argue that excluding religion
from such activity is impossible6 and unfair,7 that religious beliefs exist on the
same epistemological level as other types of political and moral beliefs, 8 and

3. Greene, The PoliticalBalance, supra note 1, at 1614 (observing that reliance on religious reasons
"excludes those who do not share the faith from meaningful participation in political discourse and
from meaningful access to the source of normative authority predicating law"); see also GREENAWALT,
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 1, at 76 (describing and rejecting an accessibility argument raised by
Thomas Nagel); Audi, The Place of Religious Argument, supra note 2, at 690 (noting that some reasons
"cannot motivate ... rational[ly] informed person[s]" to do certain things).
4. Reliance on religious reasons in public discourse could therefore cause harmful consequences to
such discourse, making it more polarized, intolerant, and persecutory. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 219 ("Why isn't it all right to advocate political positions in terms of
narrower religious convictions? ... [I]n actuality, such discourse promotes a sense of separation
between the speaker and those who do not share his religious convictions and is likely to produce both
religious and political divisiveness."); Khalend Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in
Liberal Democracies, 29 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1525, 1539 (1996) ("My own inclination is that if social
and political discourses are to avoid polarization, a degree of self-restraint is necessary."); William P.
Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 859 (1993) ("[R]eligion has its dark side.
This dark side, moreover, has the potential to be a powerfully destructive political force. It may, for
example, harm the process of political decisionmaking .... Religion, if unleashed as a political force,
may also lead to a particularly acrimonious divisiveness among different religions .. . . Finally, and
most problematically, religion's participation in the political process can produce dangerous results:
Fervent beliefs fueled by suppressed fear are easily transformed into movements of intolerance,
repression, hate, and persecution.").
5. See Sherry, supra note 1, at 502 ("[lI]n America, in actuality, allowing religious reasons to justify
public policy will have a negative effect on minorities, especially Jews. The idea of favoring religion in
general over non-religion is a chimera, because in America, such a policy will always have the effect of
favoring Christianity over other religions.").
6. See GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 155 ("To demand that many devout
Catholics, Protestants, and Jews pluck out their religious convictions is to ask them how they would
think about a critical moral problem if they started from scratch, disregarding what they presently take
as basic premises of moral thought. Asking that people perform this exercise is ... unrealistic in the
sense of impossible"); PERRY, supra note 1, at 47 (noting that it is "impossible" to maintain a wall of
separation between religiously based discourse and the discourse of public political debate); Lovin,
supra note 1, at 1523 ("This reliance on religious conviction in advance of political justification is not
an irrational act or a willful defiance of liberal principles. It stems, rather, from an understanding that
religious convictions, by their nature, override other reasons for action .... Religious imperatives are
'trump.' They overrule prudential considerations.").
7. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 155 (arguing that it is "positively
objectionable" to make religious believers separate their religious beliefs from what they think on
public issues); Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1994) ("[lI]t is
not always reasonable to bracket, or set aside for political purposes, claims arising from within
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines.").
8. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
763, 774 (1993) ("The liberal's rejection of religious-based policies suggests some sort of epistemological divide or discontinuity between what we can claim justifiably to know secularly, so to speak, and
what we can claim justifiably to know religiously, the latter being an inferior form of knowledge for
purposes of public policy, though perhaps not for other purposes. No such epistemological divide
exists, however .... "); David Hollenbach, Contexts of the PoliticalRole of Religion: Civil Society and
Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 896-97 (1993) (denying any discontinuity between religious
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that allowing religion into the public square 9 would in fact improve public
discourse because religious discourse can be as open-minded and deliberative as
so-called secular discourse,' can provide novel perspectives that otherwise
and can generally enrich and
would not make their way into public discourse,"
12
deepen the overall quality of public debate.
This argument within the field of law and religion is a subset of the broader
philosophical question of whether in a diverse and pluralistic society citizens
should "bracket" their conceptions of the good life-whether they stem from
religious beliefs or some other ethical or moral convictions 3-when talking
about and deciding issues of public concern.' 4 The leading source of such
bracketing arguments is the work of John Rawls, whose ideal of public reason,
articulated in his Political Liberalism, states that "citizens are to conduct their
public political discussions of constitutional essentials and basic justice within
the framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free
and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse."' 15 Critics
of bracketing such as Michael Sandel contend instead that "it is not always
reasonable to bracket ... claims arising from within comprehensive moral and

reasons for policy choices and other types of reasons); Idleman, supra note 1, at 343-52 (arguing
against Greene's position that religious arguments are inherently inaccessible to nonbelievers); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes
More Like Rum and Cola, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903, 913 (1993) (noting that any systematic body of
principles can be analogized to religion).
9. For the classic argument objecting to the exclusion of religion from the public square, see
generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

(1984).
10. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 46 ("[W]e probably need reminding that, at its best, religious
discourse in public culture is not less dialogic-not less open-minded, not less deliberative-than is, at
its best, secular discourse in public culture.").
11. See id. at 80 ("[T]he moral insight, the insight into the requirements of human well-being,
achieved over time by a religious tradition, as the yield of the lived experience of an historically
extended human community, might well have a resonance and indeed an authority that extends far
beyond just those who accept the tradition's religious claims."); Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation,30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 841-42 (1993) ("Even if people are exposed in
argument to ideas over which they are bound to disagree ... it does not follow that such exposure is
pointless or oppressive. For one thing, it is important for people to be acquainted with the views that
others hold. Even more important, however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its
subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics that I am initially inclined to reject.").
12. See, e.g., Hollenbach, supra note 8, at 888-96.
13. See infra note 27.
14. According to John Rawls, the conceptions of the good life that must be bracketed are those that
are comprehensive. A fully comprehensive view or doctrine, in Rawls's opinion, is one that "covers all
recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system." JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 13 (1993); see also id. at 175 ("A conception ... is comprehensive when it includes
conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are
to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct."). According to Rawls, "[tihere is a tendency for religious
and philosophical conceptions to be general and fully comprehensive; indeed, their being so is
sometimes regarded as an ideal to be realized." Id.
15. Id. at 1.
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religious doctrines,"' 6 and that such a bracketing requirement is an "unduly
severe restriction that would impoverish political discourse and rule out important dimensions of public deliberation."' 7 A public discourse "shorn of any
reliance on moral or religious convictions,"' 8 says Sandel, is one that is "too
spare to contain the moral energies of a vital democratic life."' 9
It is probably the case that if the nonbracketing side were to gain substantially
greater popular support in the United States, the most noticeable result would be
a marked increase in the use of Christian language, symbols, texts, and other
sources of authority in discourse regarding public issues. Although American
Christians by no means hold similar views on all issues of public concern, 20
86% of Americans in one study described themselves as adherents of some form
22
of Christianity,2 1 compared to 8% who claim to believe in no religion at all,
2% who describe themselves as Jewish,23 and less than 0.1% who describe
themselves as either Taoists, Sikhs, or Shintoists.2 4 And while it is unclear
whether some significant percentage of those who describe themselves as
Christians also may subscribe to a nonreligious view of the good life,2 5 it seems
overwhelmingly probable that Christianity, defined very generally, is by far the
most common comprehensive worldview in the United States. As a practical
matter, then, it is quite possible that a great deal of opposition to the nonbracketing paradigm of public discourse comes from those who fear a public square
dominated by Christian discourse.2 6
Still, total domination of discourse by Christian voices is not necessarily the
inevitable consequence of a public discourse that welcomes reliance on substantive views on the good life. If framed broadly enough, the public square would
also permit other groups to rely on their fundamental views. These groups fall
into two main categories: adherents of minority religious faiths and adherents of
comprehensive but secular conceptions of the good life.27 If the nonbracketing

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Sandel, supra note 7, at 1776.
Id.
Id. at 1790.
Id. at 1794.
See DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS

How A "CHRISTIAN COUNTRY" HAS Now BECOME
45 (2001) ("[O]ne thing is certain: Christians in the

AMERICA:

THE WORLD'S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION

new religious America are lined up on every side of every issue."); id. at 44 ("Christianity is dynamic
and multivocal, and what it means to be Christian 'in spirit and purpose' is highly contested among
Christians themselves.").
21. BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN SOCIETY 15-16 (1993).
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id.at 16.
24. Id.at 17.
25. For example, someone who identifies himself as a Christian may not be very religious at all, but
may adhere to some nonreligious view of the good life.
26. Cf Sherry, supra note 1,at 502 (calling the idea of favoring religion in general over nonreligion
a "chimera" because, in America, Christianity will always be favored).
27. Because my concern is with the practical effects of advocating a public square in which religious
views are relied upon and not with a philosophical inquiry into the propriety of allowing such views
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paradigm were to become the dominant paradigm of our public discourse, then
members of both of these groups would be able to inject their views on the good
life into public discourse to counter Christian and other views with which they
disagree.2 8 Explicitly inviting these minority views into the public square may
persuade those who hold these views to relent in their opposition to a public
square hospitable to religion. This could result in an inclusive public square
filled with views drawn from a variety of different views of the good lifemajority and minority, religious, and otherwise.
In light of this situation, an antibracketing advocate seeking to persuade the
most possible readers would want to appeal not only to Christians of all types
but also to non-Christians-both to members of other religious traditions and to
those who hold comprehensive secular views of the good life. 29 This desire to
appeal to non-Christians would be true both with respect to the actual arguments advanced by the advocate, as well as to more atmospheric aspects of the
presentation (such as emphasis and the use of examples). The advocate would
want to speak both rationally and emotively to the broadest possible audience of
Americans who have strongly held religious or moral views that are relevant to
the resolution of contentious public issues. The author, in other words, would
want to frame the public square in the broadest terms possible.
It is against this standard that this Review considers Professor Stephen
Carter's recent offering, God's Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of
Religion in Politics.30 Carter, a devoted Christian, 3 1 is one of the legal academy's most accomplished law-and-religion scholars and one of the strongest
and most articulate voices for an increased role for religion in public life.32 In

into the public square, I will not attempt to define exactly what I mean when I refer to comprehensive
secular views of the good life. Nor do I necessarily mean by this phrase the same thing that Rawls
means when he uses it. Instead, I use it simply to connote a belief system that is more or less strongly
felt, of fundamental importance to the person who holds it, and fairly broad in the scope of its
application. For example, one may believe very strongly that the pursuit of pleasure in some form
should be one of the primary (if not the primary) elements of the good life. If that person also applies
that principle broadly in how he or she thinks about public issues, as one may surmise many young
people do, then I would likely describe it as a comprehensive secular view.
28. One may argue that despite Rawls's theoretical position, the nonbracketing paradigm is in fact
the one that is dominant in America today. This Review takes no position on whether this is in fact true.
However, if it were true, then the question would become whether a greater dominance of the
nonbracketing paradigm is normatively desirable.
29. On what I mean by a comprehensive secular view of the good life, see supra note 27. It is also
the case that Carter would want to speak to those who hold no comprehensive views of the good life,
either religious or nonreligious.

30.

STEPHEN L.

CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS

(2000).
31. See id. at 3 ("I write not only as a Christian but as one who is far more devoted to the survival of
my faith-and of religion generally-than to the survival of any state in particular, including the United
States of America."); id. at 73 ("I am a citizen of the United States and owe it my allegiance. But my
first allegiance is to the God who created me."); id. at 115 (describing himself as an "evangelical
Christian"); id. at 148 (conceding that his "Christianity biases" him).
32. For a sampling of Carter's important work involving law and religion, see STEPHEN L. CARTER,
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION

(1993);
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some sense, God's Name in Vain is a sequel to Carter's immensely successful
1993 book, The Culture of Disbelief, which President Bill Clinton publicly
praised at a prayer breakfast not long after its publication for its pro-religion-inpublic-life message. 33 Carter does not play hard-to-get with his purpose in
writing God's Name in Vain. He states his "two interrelated theses" in the first
lines of the introduction to the book:
First, that there is nothing wrong, and much right, with the robust participation of the nation's many religious voices in debates over matters of public
moment. Second, that religions ... will almost always lose their best, most
choose to be involved in the partisan, electoral side
spiritual selves when 3they
4
of American politics.

Carter's book is strong. Most notably, Carter explains with great clarity and
persuasiveness why religious views should not be excluded categorically from
the public square, basing his argument on the unique nature of religious belief,
the historical record of religion in American public life, and the contributions
that religious views can make to public discourse. He also sounds a compelling
cautionary note for religious believers to consider when deciding whether and
how to participate in public and political life in the United States. Coming at a
time when much public debate is focused upon whether the state should
broaden opportunities for religious organizations offering social welfare services to share in public funds,35 Carter's contribution is both timely and
important.
However, Carter misses a critical opportunity in God's Name in Vain. Al-

Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977;
Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1194 (1997); Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Family Matters: A Tribute to
Justice Brennan, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2000); Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if
Religion Matters, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1059 (1999); Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious
Freedom, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118 (1993); Stephen L. Carter, Liberalism's Religion Problem, FIRST
THINGS,

Mar. 2002, at 21.

33. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1655. Carter himself observes that God's Name in Vain "tak[es] on
a basic question" that Culture of Disbelief"left for another day: If religion is to be actively involved in
politics, what is the proper form of that involvement?" CARTER, supra note 30, at 6.
34. Id. at 1.
35. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001) ("Establishment of White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives"); see also Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg.
8,497 (Jan. 29, 2001) (setting out agency responsibilities with respect to faith-based initiatives); Nathan
J. Diament, A Faith-Based Rorschach Test, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2001, at A27 (noting the variety of
fears about the plan); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Dilulio'sFaith-BasedChallenge, WASH. POST, March 30, 2001, at
A29 (noting that Bush's plan to offer government aid to social programs run by religious groups "has
unleashed intense argument and soul-searching"); Amy Fagan, Senate Pressuredon Faith Initiative,
WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 2002, at A4 (describing a trip to Connecticut by Representative J.C. Watts,
during which he advocated a broader faith-based initiative than the one proposed by Senator Lieberman); Laurie Goodstein, A Clerical, and Racial, Gap Over FederalHelp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2001, at
A l (discussing the disagreement over Bush's plan); Steven Waldman, Doubts Among the Faithful, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, A19 (discussing the conservative opposition to the plan).
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though it is clear that at least part of Carter's goal is to convince skeptics to
welcome religion into the public square,3 6 both his argument and his style lack
the inclusiveness to complete this project successfully. Specifically, Carter's
case is likely to be unpersuasive to two key groups he needs to persuade if the
"religious voice" is ever fully to be "welcome[d] ... taken seriously, respected,

and honored ' 37 in the public square: religious non-Christians, and those who
possess comprehensive secular views of the good life. With respect to religious
non-Christians, although it seems clear that Carter would support a public
square filled with all sorts of religious voices and although his argument
logically supports the development of such an inclusive public square, his
presentation in this particular work focuses overwhelmingly on Christian sources,
stories, and values, and therefore does not speak effectively to those who do not
share his Christian orientation. With respect to those who possess other comprehensive secular views of the good life, Carter not only fails to include them in
his vision of the public square, but by denigrating all nonreligious viewpoints,
his message is almost certain to alienate nonbelievers and therefore to be
unpersuasive to them. Because Carter does not frame his public square broadly
enough, he is unlikely to persuade those citizens who are otherwise opposed to
an open public square to relent in that opposition.
This Review proceeds in two parts. Part I lays out Carter's two primary
arguments and contends that although Carter likely overstates the hostility of
"elites" to religion and is somewhat unclear regarding how nonbelievers should
treat religious views in the public square, he does successfully articulate a
persuasive case to support his two theses. Part II maintains that Carter's
argument is nonetheless not inclusive enough to be broadly persuasive. Part II.A
discusses religious non-Christians. Part 11.B discusses those who hold comprehensive secular worldviews.
I.

RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: IN OR OUT?
A.

IN

Carter's first thesis is that religious people may and should rely on religious
36. Concededly, Carter in large part is speaking to other religious believers, and other Christians, as
is evidenced by his arguments concerning when and how religious believers, particularly Christians,
ought to participate in public discourse and politics. But in other places Carter explicitly notes that he is
speaking to non-Christians and nonbelievers. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 30, at ix (observing that it
is important to present one's scholarly ideas to learned but skeptical audiences and that he has
attempted to do so); id. at 4 ("I hasten to add that one need not be a Christian, or be religious at all,
to engage with and, I hope, profit from the stories I will tell."); id. at 74 n.* (explaining a theological point to "non-Christians"). More importantly, Carter's arguments that are aimed at explaining
why elites are wrong to want to exclude religion from public life seem directed at those very elites; it is
hard to understand what purpose those arguments would have if they were not intended for that
audience. See, e.g., id. at 108-09 (explaining why liberalism is wrong to insist on the exclusion of
the "religious voice"); id. at 113 (arguing that the religious voice "should be welcomed" in democratic politics).
37. Id. at 42.
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reasons when debating public issues. 38 Because Carter believes that, with the
exception of "political, legal, and media elites," few Americans would agree
that religion has no place in politics, 39 it would appear that Carter's purpose in
articulating and defending this thesis is, at least in part, to convince these elites
that their position on religion in politics is incorrect. Carter reiterates his
premise-that elites are opposed to religion in politics-numerous times throughout the book. He observes, for example, that elites "fear that religions might
have too much influence in America's public life,"4 ° that "we are ... subjected
to a steady drumbeat [from elites] to the effect that ...it is ...wrong ...for
the state to pay attention to arguments couched in religious terms,' that "[i]t is
a commonplace ... among elites ... to treat religionists working for change as
presumptively fanatical, 42 and that "[o]n America's elite campuses, today, it is
perfectly acceptable for professors to use their classrooms to attack religion, to
mock it, to trivialize it, and to refer to those to whom faith truly matters as
dupes." 43 Carter also invokes concrete examples from recent headlines to
support his premise, pointing to the opposition by elites to a Pontifical Council
paper on ethics in advertising 44 and the rejection by elites of religious opposition to state-run lotteries in Alabama 45 as examples of hostility by elites to
religion in public life.
Carter believes this hostility to religion is "peculiar and sad," 4 6 and he
musters at least three sets of arguments against it. First, he argues that, because
of the special nature of religious belief, religious people will always tend to rely
on religious reasons when thinking and talking about important public issues.
Carter paints a picture of religious belief as fundamental, in that it "provide[s]
meanings ... of a deep and transcendent sort" ;47 as comprehensive, in that it is
"not merely an aspect of life, to be divided from its other parts" ;48 and as
involuntary in some important sense, in that it provides "God-given absolutes,
rules of behavior that humans are not free to vary.",49 Because of religion's
special nature, Carter suggests that religion will almost always form the background of debates over public policy, even if reliance on religion is not always

38. See id. at 1.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 79.
42. Id. at 97.
43. Id. at 187.
44. See id. at 111.
45. See id. at 98-99.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.at 25.
48. Id.; see also id. at 72 ("As any serious student of religion knows, religion has no sphere."); id. at
73 (noting that none of the three principal Western religious traditions "conceives of the world as
divided into that which God created and therefore rules and that which God did not and does not").
49. Id. at 44 (noting that "for millions of Americans, moral rules are God-given"). The labels used
here-fundamental, comprehensive, involuntary-are labels I use to describe Carter's description of
religion, not necessarily the same labels he himself would use.
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explicit. As he explains, "How could matters be otherwise? Religion, by focusing the attention of the believer on the idea of transcendent truth, necessarily
changes the person the believer is; which in turn changes the way the believer
interacts with the world; which in turn changes political outcomes." 50
Second, Carter argues that religion has always played a prominent role in
American politics and that therefore it would be incorrect to claim that
reliance on religious reasons is somehow un-American or undemocratic. 5'
Carter argues that "[r]eligion has been inseparable from American politics
for as long as America has had politics, and will likely remain inseparable as
long as Americans remain religious. 52 He goes on to posit that "in the
absence of the religious voice, American politics itself becomes unimaginable." 53 In support of these claims, Carter points to a number of historical
examples, including the involvement of Christian evangelicals in the abolitionist movement of the mid-nineteenth century,5 4 the role of the Social
Gospel movement in bringing about early-twentieth-century social welfare
reforms, 55 and the participation of Christian clergy in the civil-rights movement in the 1960s.5 6
Finally, Carter argues that religious discourse in the public square is normatively desirable. Religion, he says, offers the antidote to America's moral
laziness, 57 "fills a hole in the human soul that the more material aspects of our
world leave agape, ,,58 and can provide "radical possibilities that might transform us, did we but listen.",59 By offering meanings of the world that are often
at odds with the meanings promoted by the state, Carter argues, religion can be
subversive of dominant meanings and can call witness when the state veers
away from a moral path. 60 This brings political discourse to a higher level. For
example, Carter explains that, in contrast to the "vapid" morality preached by
American culture, 6 ' religion "call[s] us to something higher and better,",62 gives
meaning to politics, 6 3 and provides the moral force needed for democracy to
have purpose. 64

50. Id. at 160-61.
5 1. See id. at 20 ("[T]here is nothing un-American, undemocratic, or even particularly strange about
religious activism and religious language in politics.").
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 5.
54. See id. at 83-99.
55. See id. at 101-07.
56. See id. at 33.
57. See id. at 195.
58. Id. at 172.
59. Id. at 108.
60. See, e.g., id. at 26-30, 33-34, 171.
61. Id. at 44.
62. Id. at 5.
63. See id. at 7 ("But a politics without religion is empty of meaning.").
64. See id. at 31 ("A democracy that lacks the moral force of religious understanding is likely to be a
democracy without purpose.").
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B. OUT

Although Carter thinks elites are wrong to insist that religion be kept out of
the public square, he argues that there may be good reasons for religious
believers themselves to decide to steer clear of certain types of public participation. After considering and rejecting four objections to the involvement of
religious voices in politics that he terms "clunkers" (that such involvement is
un-American, contrary to the First Amendment, dangerous, and harmful to
discourse because religion is uniquely dogmatic),6 5 Carter articulates the two
objections that are sufficiently "serious" to merit consideration by religious
believers. First, Carter describes the "Integrity Objection," which argues that
"[w]hen a religious community becomes too regularly involved in politics, the
community loses touch with its own best self and risks losing the power, and the
obligation, to engage in witness from afar, to stand outside the corridors of
power and call those within to righteousness. 6 6 Second, Carter details the
"Electoral Objection," which states that
[wlhen a religion decides to involve itself in the partisan side of politics, in
supporting one candidate or party over another, it not only runs a high risk of
error; it also, inevitably, winds up softening its message, compromising
doctrine to make it more palatable to a public that might remain unpersuaded
by the Word unadulterated.67

Because of the strength of these two objections, Carter concludes that religions "must be extraordinarily cautious" about becoming politically active
"because too much politics can destroy them."' 68 He contends that when deciding whether to lend their voices to public debate, religious believers must "take
the time for prayer and discernment to be sure that they have chosen the right
issues, the right tactics, and the right moment. ' 69 Carter is particularly cautious
about religion becoming involved in electoral politics, arguing that religions
"should, with rare exceptions, avoid the temptation to take sides in electoral
contests.",70 As illustrations of the dangers posed to religion when it becomes
involved in such contests, Carter points to the black clergy's religiously "disastrous" involvement with the Democratic party in the 1960s, 7 ' and the Christian
72
Coalition's involvement with the Republican Party in the 1980s and 1990s.

65. See id. at 20-22.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 6; see also id. at 20 ("My thesis is simply that religion, when it engages in the public life of
the nation, must do so with some care.").
69. Id. at 113.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 35-39.
72. See id. at 52-58.
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Carter believes that it is nearly inevitable that religion will be sullied by
electoral politics. As he puts it regarding the black clergy in the 1960s:
Once the decision to become electorally active was made, the power of

prophetic ministry was lost. If you are in the business of endorsing candidates
and pushing for their election, you can hardly pretend to stand outside the
corridors of power to call the nation to righteousness. You are far more likely
to soften the message, reinterpret
the Gospels, and do what is necessary to
73
retain the status of the insider.
Although Carter believes that religious people and organizations should enter
into public debates "with some care," 74 he does consider in some depth several

issues that he thinks can benefit from a religious viewpoint.75 For example,
Carter believes that the religious voice, particularly in the form of the traditional
Christian just-war doctrine, would greatly benefit public dialogue concerning
the use of force by nation-states.76 He also argues that religious believers should
actively resist the prevailing ideology of "measurism," which Carter defines as
"[that which can be measured is of greater importance than that which cannot.",77 He further urges religious people of all faiths to "unite [around] the
near-absolute right of every other religion to worship and follow its own
God."' 78 Finally, for those times when religious people choose not to resort to
politics, Carter offers three alternative possibilities: (1) escape from public
culture to private "parallel institutions" such as home schools, private courts,
and television-free households; 79 (2) investment of time in pondering, reflective
thought as an antidote to the overly fast-paced and unreflective American
culture; 80 and (3) boycotts of products that are culturally destructive."'
C.

EVALUATING THE ARGUMENT: PROS AND CONS

1. Pros
God's Name in Vain has significant strengths. First, and perhaps most importantly, Carter does an excellent job educating his audience about the nature of
73. Id. at 39.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 121.
76. See id. at 121 (identifying issues "over which religions might choose to resist"); id. at 126-36
(discussing these issues).
77. Id. at 141. Carter believes the "measurism" ideology leads to lying (because we justify our lying
by pointing to something we can measure, like the self-esteem of another person), divorce (because we
divorce to promote our own happiness, something we can measure), and the overuse of standardized
tests, among other ills. See id. at 137-56.
78. Id. at 158.
79. See CARTER, supra note 30, at 114-16. Carter describes and endorses in large part a suggestion
by Paul Weyrich that evangelicals "have to look at what we can do to separate ourselves from this
hostile culture." Id. at 115.
80. See id. at 117-19.
81. See id. at 119-21.
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religion and religion's history in the United States, a key component of any
project seeking to persuade citizens to be less distrustful of religion. On the
whole, Americans are not very knowledgeable when it comes to religion. 8 2 This
lack of knowledge is partly due to the failure of American public schools to
teach their students much about religion.8 3 Teachers are generally not trained to
teach the subject, 84 and adequate classroom materials have been slow in coming. 85 Even history textbooks treat religion's role in the development of the
United States in a perfunctory and superficial manner.86 As a result, American
students graduate from the country's educational system without knowing much
about the nature of religious belief and practice, the specifics of religious
traditions, or the contributions of religion to U.S. and world history.
This state of affairs is unfortunate for several reasons. 8 7 Most importantly, for
Carter's purposes, ignorance about religion likely skews people's attitudes
toward the question of whether religion may properly, as a normative matter,
play a vital role in public decisionmaking and discourse. At least at the popular
level, it is never quite clear whether hostility to religion in the public square
stems from something about religion itself or whether it stems more from

82. See ECK, supra note 20, at 70 ("Americans, on the whole, have a high degree of religious
identification ... and yet a very low level of religious literacy.").
83. See WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA 212
(1995) (citing study from the 1980s indicating that only 640 of 15,000 public high schools offered
courses in religion, and that only 0.2% of all students were enrolled); WARREN A. NORD & CHARLES C.
HAYNES, TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY ACROSS THE CURRICULUM 2 (1998) (noting that the typical high
school curriculum "all but ignores religion"); Jay D. Wexler, Preparingfor the Clothed Public Square:
Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1164-66 (2002) (arguing that public schools should teach students about religion to prepare them for
citizenship in a pluralistic democracy). Recent years, however, have begun to see significant progress in
teaching about religion in public schools, in large part due to the efforts of educational reformers such
as Charles C. Haynes and Warren A. Nord. See id. at 1166-67.
84. See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 84, at 91 ("For the teacher, the challenge of achieving even
minimal fairness in the treatment of religion when teaching world and U.S. history is daunting to say
the least. Few teachers have much background in religious studies."); George R. La Noue, The
Conditions of Public School Neutrality, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 22, 30 (Theodore R. Sizer

ed., 1967) ("Assuming it were possible to design a satisfactory comparative religion course, the
enormous shortage of qualified teachers in this field remains a serious problem.").
85. See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 84, at 78-79 ("[T]extbooks are still woefully inadequate in their
treatment of religion. World history texts do provide brief accounts of the basic teachings and practices
of the major religions as they appear in history, but, in our view, the texts do not give enough space to
the topics to enable students to make sense of these traditions.").
86. See, e.g.,

PAUL

C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP:

EVIDENCE OF

BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S T)EXTBOOKS 56-57

(1986) (pointing out that textbooks make little mention of religion in American history in the last 75 to
100 years); George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 870
(1988) ("Textbooks ignore the role of religion in history .... ").
87. As I have argued elsewhere, teaching students about religion would carry several important civic
benefits, including training students to reason about public issues from various intellectual perspectives,
giving them knowledge of religion's role in history so they can understand more fully current public
controversies, preparing them to evaluate intelligently government action affecting religious belief and
practice, teaching them to understand how and why religious citizens rely on their religious beliefs
when talking about and reaching decisions about issues of public concern and promoting tolerance,
mutual respect, and empathy. See Wexler, supra note 83, at 1200-20.
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ignorance of religion and tte fear that follows from this lack of knowledge and
understanding. In light of this uncertainty, it is important for schools and other
educators, such as those like Carter who write for public consumption, to make
efforts to teach their audiences about the nature and history of religion. Only
when American society has become better educated about religion will we have
sufficient information to be able to make high quality decisions about religion's
proper role in the public square.
Carter furthers this educative project particularly well. He persuasively debunks several myths about religion that may contribute to the position that
religion should be kept out of the public square. To begin with, as in Culture of
Disbelief,Carter successfully counters the view that religious people can simply
bracket their worldviews in certain situations, observing those views only when
they choose to do so, in private and concealed settings, or when it may be
advantageous to them. 88 Through well-chosen examples and his typically powerful prose, Carter impresses upon the reader a different view of religious belief
and practice-one in which religion affects the believer's very personhood at all
times and in all situations. Especially compelling is Carter's example of Fannie
Lou Hamer, the "founder and guiding spirit of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party," who refused to compromise with the Johnson administration on
her party's religiously motivated position that the state's delegates to the
Democratic National Convention should be racially integrated. 89 "Hamer sought
justice," Carter writes, "Humphrey sought electoral victory (with justice as a
possible, but not certain, side effect). And that is why the negotiation failed." 90
Carter also persuasively takes on both the idea that religion has played a
marginal role in American public life over the course of the nation's history and
the idea that when it has played a significant role, it has done so only to promote
conservative or reactionary causes. By tracing religion's central role in the
development of the United States's abolitionist and civil rights movements,
Carter reminds readers that in addition to the nonliberal causes recently associated with religious thought, such as the opposition to civil rights for gays and
lesbians, religious viewpoints can support causes typically thought of as liberal.
Religion, Carter points out, can and has been a friend to both sides of the
political spectrum. This point, it seems, is directed at the elites that Carter seeks
to convince, and it is well-chosen and likely to have some impact on this portion
of his audience.
Second, Carter effectively links his descriptive project regarding the nature of
religion and religion's history to his normative claim that religion should not be
excluded from the public square. One of the most powerful arguments in favor
of allowing religion into the public square is the fairness concern-that it is
fundamentally unfair to require religious believers to put aside their religious

88. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 30, at 7.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 28.
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beliefs when talking about and deciding issues of public concern. This normative argument rests on a descriptive claim about the nature of religious belief as
being, for example, fundamental, comprehensive, and involuntary. Because
Carter makes his descriptive claim so well, the leap to his normative conclusion
becomes practically effortless. Through his historical presentation, moreover,
Carter bolsters the'normative position that religion need not be kept out of
public life on the grounds that it is particularly harmful to public discourse. If,
as a descriptive matter, religion has often played a liberating and positive force
in American history, then, as a normative matter, it would not be appropriate to
exclude it from the American public square on ground that it is inevitably a
reactionary and divisive force. Carter makes this link from the descriptive to the
normative seamlessly and forcefully.
Finally, Carter's second thesis-that religious believers should decide to
participate in political life only with great caution-is likewise very important.
Carter reaches back to the thought of Roger Williams and beyond to argue in
favor of a version of separationism that has as its purpose the protection of the
religious life (the "garden," in Williams's terms) from the secular world (the
"wilderness"), rather than the other way around. 9 ' Carter maintains that it is
important to protect the garden from the wilderness for many reasons, but
perhaps the most important one is to preserve the "ability of the religious to
resist the dominant understanding of life and the world that the state will try to
impose. ,92 The inhabitants of the garden, in turn, must be wary of entering the
wilderness too quickly, not because the wilderness has any authority or right to
police the wall that separates the two realms, but because only in the garden can
religious communities and believers cultivate the alternative meanings that will
allow them to challenge the dominant values of the wilderness when those
values stray too far from the ideals of justice. In talking about the religious
opposition to racial discrimination and slavery, for example, Carter observes:
[T]he religious dissenters were able to exist at all because the wall of
separation protected the garden, enabling them to create meanings of their
own. That resistance to the wilderness may not be the only truth and the only
the point of view of
value of the separation of church and state, but it is, from
93
both religion and democracy, surely the most important.
One finds echoes of this argument in the recent debates over the propriety of
funneling public funds to religious organizations providing social-welfare benefits, 9 4 but Carter's point is more subtle and profound than the often-voiced

91. Id. at 75-79 (discussing Reformation theology).
92. Id. at 77.
93. Id. at 78.
94. See, e.g., Dana Milbank & Thomas Edsall, FaithInitiative May Be Revised: Criticism Surprises
Administration, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al (describing opposition to charitable choice from
religious leaders who "worry that churches would be corrupted by government regulations").
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concern that the strings attached to those public funds may undermine the
autonomy and integrity of the religious organizations that receive those funds.
Carter's argument is not simply that entering the wilderness will tend to corrupt
those who live in the garden-though he surely believes that in some situations
this is possible and quite troubling-but that this corruption will harm both
those who live in the garden and those who live in the wilderness. Those who
live in the wilderness, Carter suggests, need the wall for their own protection
not because they will be invaded by garden-dwellers, 9 5 but because they may
need to be rescued by the garden-dwellers and the multiple meanings that those
garden-dwellers cultivate on their side of the wall. 96 This is a subtle and
significant point, and one that bears serious consideration by all parties considering the many issues relating to the current policy debate over public funding of
religious organizations.
2. Cons
Despite all of these strengths, several problems detract from God's Name in
Vain's otherwise powerful messages. The most important of these-the overly
narrow framing of the public square-is addressed by the next Part of the
Review. This Part considers two less important but still troublesome concerns.
First, Carter's position that elites harbor excessive ill will toward religion is
not persuasively supported and seems seriously overstated.9 7 Carter says that
elites fear that religions have too much influence in America's public life,9 8 but
he cites no authority to support this contention, and the poll he cites to support
his next claim-that few Americans agree with the elites--does not distinguish
between elites and nonelites. 99 He says that believers are subjected to a steady
drumbeat from elites, sounding out that it is wrong for the state to pay attention
to religiously framed arguments, but this so-called drumbeat is unsupported by
any evidence or citation.'0 0 Carter asserts that it is commonplace for elites to
treat religionists as fanatical, but again he provides no citation.' 0O He says that it
is perfectly acceptable for elite professors to mock religion in the classroom and
to cite no authority when referring in their work to the religiously devout as

95. See CARTER, supra note 30, at 80 (noting that the view of the wall of separation as a means to
protect nonbelievers from the ideas of believers is mistaken).
96. The civil rights and abolitionist movements are examples of this type of rescue, according to
Carter. He argues both are cases in which religious believers were instrumental in restoring justice to
the secular world. Id. at 33, 83-99.
97. I will concede that many scientists and other "elites" do seem to harbor ill-will toward theories
of human origins that deny the theory of evolution. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas,People,
and the FirstAmendment: The Constitutionalityof Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools,
49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 439-40, 441,469 (1997).
98. CARTER, supra note 30, at 4.
99. Id. at 4, 197, 198 n.3.
100. Id. at 79.
101. Id. at 97. Carter does tell the story of the religious opposition to state-run lotteries in Alabama
on the next page, see id. at 98, which I address below. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:183

narrow-minded and irrational, 0 2 but he provides neither0 3concrete examples nor
persuasive citations of his own to back up these claims.
Nor are Carter's specific examples persuasive evidence of the phenomenon
he purports to describe. For instance, Carter cites as evidence of the culture's
resistance to religion the response of Madison Avenue to the document of the
1997 Pontifical Council for Social Communication regarding ethics inadvertising, in which an arm of the Vatican urged that advertising "be governed by an
ethical code that would, among other things, resist the sexualization of human
beings and the use of deceit and outright falsehood as selling tools."'04 But
although a few advertising executives reportedly did speak disparagingly of the
report (one said the Vatican should "stick to religion"),' 0 5 the response of the
elite culture was by no means uniformly (or even significantly) as hostile as
Carter suggests.
For one thing, the fact that a few advertising executives objected to the report
does not establish that all of elite culture opposes religious efforts to reform
advertising for the simple reason that the advertising executives are uniquely
situated to lose out if the religious suggestions were implemented. It is unfair to
impart the views of those who would stand to be directly affected or regulated
in some way by the religious viewpoint to those elites who do not stand in a
similar position; it should not be surprising to find that advertising executives
themselves would react negatively to any suggestion that they have been acting
unethically, regardless of the source of that criticism. But, perhaps more to the
point, there were several indications that elite culture (to the extent that such a
thing actually exists) did in fact treat the Council's report with respect. For
example, the Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, the official publication of
CARTER, supra note 30, at 187.
103. Carter does claim that he personally has "heard some of the wisest scholars in the country
deride religious beliefs and religious believers in terms so full of stereotype and ...bigotry that we
would be appalled were they to say similar things about just about any other group." Id. at 187. But he
does not tell us who these scholars are or what they actually said. More importantly, even conceding for
the sake of argument that a few scholars have said bigoted things about religion, this does not establish
that it is seen as "perfectly acceptable" on elite campuses for professors to mock religion or that
"[a]ntireligious slurs have become a commonplace of intellectual discourse." Id. Although Carter does
not provide a cite for the proposition that scholars are "not expected to cite any authority when, in their
academic work, they refer to the religiously devout as narrow-minded, irrational, or poorly educated,"
he does put a footnote at the end of the previous paragraph in which he cites his own Culture of
Disbeliefand George Marsden's The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment
to EstablishedNon-Belief(1995), a book that he himself calls polemical. According to Carter, "there is
much hostility to religion on campus." CARTER, supra note 30, at 238 n. 1. But again, even if there were
such hostility on elite American campuses (and I should say that my own personal experiences at
several of these campuses does not lead me to agree with Carter's descriptive claim), this does not
demonstrate that such hostility is generally viewed as acceptable or that it is generally accepted that
professors may make bigoted claims about religious believers without citation (or with citation, for that
matter) to authority.
104. Carter, supra note 30 at I11.
105. See Carol Krol, Pontifical Council Sets Guidelines for Making Ads: Vatican Values Leave U.S.
Admen Unimpressed, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 37 (describing reactions of advertising
executives).

102.
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the American Marketing Association, published a series of articles devoted to
serious consideration of the issues raised by the report and gave nothing but the
utmost respect to views of the Pontifical Council.' 0 6 In addition, the journal
Advertising Age printed excerpts from the report in its magazine and put the
entire report on its website; 10 7 representatives of the Council participated 0in8
conferences with advertising executives in both Baltimore and Dayton, Ohio;'
and at least one member of the media elite, a senior writer from Newsweek
whom Carter unsurprisingly does not cite, wrote to the editor of Advertising Age
that the report "sounds like common sense ... [unlike] the puerile comments

you collected from industry executives, all of whom strike me as folks who
could use whatever ethical guidelines they can find ... ,,09
Carter's example regarding treatment by elites of religious opposition to a
proposed state-run lottery in Alabama fares no better at establishing the proposition that elites foster substantial ill-will towards religion. Carter reports that for
several weeks, preachers who opposed a state-run lottery "thundered" against
the proposal from the pulpit, but lottery backers did not take this opposition
seriously.1 0 When the lottery proposal failed, Carter says the "supporters
retreated into sour grapes," complaining that, "[tihere were the religionists
again, imposing their fanatical opinions on everybody else.""' The article that
Carter cites as a "lucid summary" of this campaign, however, says nothing at all
about elite resistance to religious ideas. Instead, it focuses on the very real
dilemma faced by many religionists: Should they resist a practice they find
immoral even if it means costing the community (and their parishioners)
hundreds or thousands of jobs?" 2 Moreover, it is unclear from the account
provided by the article whether the preachers were able to defeat the proposal in
Alabama (and gain a related victory in South Carolina)," 3 over the objections

106. See, e.g., George G. Brenkert, Ethics in Advertising: The Good, the Bad, and the Church, 17 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 325 (1998); Gene R. Laczniak, Distributive Justice, Catholic Social Teach-

ing, and the Moral Responsibility of Marketers, 18 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 125 (1999); Gene R.
Laczniak, Reflections on the 1997 Vatican Statements Regarding Ethics in Advertising, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y
& MARKETING 320 (1998); Patrick E. Murphy, Ethics in Advertising: Review, Analysis, and Suggestions,
17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 316 (1998); Debra Jones Ringold, A Comment on the Pontifical Council
for Social Communications'Ethicsin Advertising, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 332 (1998).
107. Vatican's Ad Ethics Report Now Online, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 14, 1997, at 18.

108. See Religion In Brief, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 26, 1997, at 9C (describing symposium
regarding advertising reform attended by Catholic scholars and advertising and media professionals);
John Rivera, Wanted: Saints in Advertising, BALT. SUN, Nov. 11, 1997, at 2A (describing event in which
Archbishop John P. Foley, "the Vatican's point man on communications," spoke to advertising
executives at Baltimore's Belvedere Hotel).
109. Letters to the Editor,ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 24, 1997, at 16.
110. CARTER, supra note 30, at 98.

111. Id. This is Carter's paraphrase of the attitude of the elites, not a purportedly direct quotation
from any particular elite.
112. See Suzi Parker, Gambling's Rise Splits Southern Communities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec.
29, 1999, at 3.
113. See id. (noting that churches defeated the video gambling industry in South Carolina and plans
for a lottery in Alabama).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:183

of the elites or rather in tandem with those elites. After all, it is not always clear
exactly who these elites are and whether, as seems possible in the Alabama
case, the elites and the religious leaders in any particular locus of political
authority are, at least in large part, the very same people.
Carter may respond here that his argument in this book is not intended solely
for a scholarly audience (much less an audience of footnote-silly legal academics) and that therefore he should not have to produce the kind of voluminous
citations that such an audience usually demands. After all, if someone whom
people find to be an insightful and keen observer perceives a social phenomenon of great importance and seeks to communicate this phenomenon to a
popular audience, why should that person not simply be able to report his or her
perceptions? Should it not be enough for Carter simply to assert his belief that
elites treat religion with hostility and disrespect? Surely the reader can be
trusted to decide thoughtfully whether to believe him.
This would be a fair point if Carter did not need to establish the proposition
to convince a significant portion of his audience-the very elites he is criticizing-of the benefits of allowing religious arguments into the public square.
Carter's proposition-that elites foster ill-will toward religion-is controversial
and to a large degree counterintuitive. Yes, there are those members of the
country's political, business, and academic elite who are hostile to religion, but
is it really a majority of those elites or even a significant percentage? As a legal
academic myself, I take it that I may be considered an elite by Carter. Even
though I have seen occasional outbursts of prejudice by other elites against
religion, by far my experience has been that my colleagues in the academy and
in the federal government have been very respectful of religion and those who
hold religious beliefs-even if those colleagues themselves have not held such
beliefs and even if they believe that there are substantial reasons why people
should not rely on religious reasons when debating public issues. Perhaps it is
true that "one cannot help but hear echoes of the old pro-slavery separationism
in the shrill insistence of lottery supporters" that their opponents were wrong to
rely on their religious beliefs, but I for one am not persuaded by Carter's
assertion of the point standing alone." 14

114. This problem is compounded for Carter by the way he denigrates nonreligious sources of values
in numerous places throughout the book. See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text. The problem
also is compounded by the derisive manner in which Carter treats several scholars who believe that the
interests of public education should, in some circumstances, trump the interests of religious parents
who object to certain values and lessons asserted by public school curricula. Carter criticizes such
scholars as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and Suzanna Sherry, who believe that public schools
should be free to impart liberal values to students over the objections of their parents. Carter claims that
under the arguments proposed by these scholars, the family "becomes a little baby-making factory,
whose purpose is to create children for the benefit of the state." CARTER, supra note 30, at 181. This
claim is incendiary and unfair, and it casts doubt on the reasonableness of Carter's other, more
tempered positions. These scholars do grant greater latitude to the state than Carter would to educate
children in virtues that may be offensive to certain religious parents, but they all clearly recognize that
the family is more than a "baby-making factory." See e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 300
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Second, although several times Carter faults certain responses by elites to
religious arguments on issues of public concern, he does not specify clearly
enough what is objectionable about those responses or how those who disagree
substantively with religious arguments may properly respond to those arguments. If Carter is right that religious arguments may properly be relied upon in
public (and I think he is), then one way to frame his conclusion is to say that it
would be inappropriate for someone who disagrees with a religious argument
advanced in public to respond by saying that the comment is "illegitimate,"
"undemocratic," "un-American," or some such similar label that identifies the
religious argument as procedurally out of bounds. But to say this is certainly not
to say that religious arguments advanced in public are off limits for substantive
disagreement and criticism, even perhaps severe criticism going to the very
basis of those arguments. As more and more agreement is reached on the
procedural propriety of relying on religion in public policy debates, it will
become more important to shift attention to the question of how religious
arguments can and should be treated and how best for critics to counter
religious arguments if procedural arguments are inappropriate. Such an inquiry,
in turn, will shed important light on whether allowing religious arguments into
the public square will actually improve discourse on important public issues.
Carter unfortunately does not undertake this important task, and while this
omission is perhaps unsurprising given Carter's aims in the book, it nonetheless
renders his argument less complete and therefore less persuasive than it otherwise may have been. A similar critique of Carter's work was made by Richard
Rorty with respect to The Culture of Disbelief."5 In Rorty's view, religion is a
"conversation-stopper" when invoked in political discussion with those outside
the relevant religious community. 116 In light of this view, Rorty criticized Carter
for not considering how a nonreligious person should react to invocation of a
religious argument in the public square:
Carter clearly thinks such a reaction [telling the religious person that his
religious beliefs "are not our concern"] inappropriate, but it is hard to figure
out what he thinks would be an appropriate response by nonreligious interlocutors to the claim that abortion is required (or forbidden) by the will of God.
He does not think it good enough to say: OK, but since I don't think there is

(1999) (noting that although "citizens may legitimately mandate a civic education that is appropriate to
a democracy of free and equal citizenship," nonetheless "parents have extensive authority over the
education of their children"); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERsITY AND DisTRUST: Civic EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 241 (2000) ("In general, we do well to trust parents to make decisions for
their children within a wide but not unlimited range of discretion."); id. at 244 ("The family is an
especially important form of community-and I have conceded that parents have a right and indeed a
responsibility to teach their children about the excellences of human character .... "); Suzanna Sherry,
Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 160 (1995) ("I am not
arguing that parents should have no control over their children's education ....
115. Rorty, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
116. Id.
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such a thing as the will of God, and since I doubt that we'll get anywhere
arguing theism vs. atheism, let's see if we have some shared premises on the
basis of which to continue our argument about abortion. He thinks such a
reply would be condescending and trivializing. But are we atheist interlocutors supposed to try to keep the conversation going by saying, "Gee! I'm
we try that.
impressed. You must have a really deep, sincere faith?" Suppose
1 17
What happens then? What can either party do for an encore?

To be fair, Carter does make a few suggestions about how nonbelievers ought
to treat religion in the public square. He says, for example, that the "religious
voice ... should always be welcome, its words taken seriously, respected, and

honored, even if, in the end, society chooses to go another way." 1 8 Furthermore, in discussing the fundamental disagreements between religious believers
and nonbelievers on many important issues, 1 9 Carter suggests that "it cannot be
the case that we do something wicked when we describe someone else's belief
as false," but that "we must tread carefully in such conversations."' 20 "Form
matters," says Carter. "There is criticism, and then there is attack."' 12 ' Finally,
Carter observes that it would be a "lovely world" if our political leaders felt free
disagree on the ground that they had read the
to criticize those with whom they
22
relevant scriptures incorrectly.
These hints are helpful, but they are far from comprehensive enough to
23
provide a full picture of public discourse in a religiously clothed public square. 1
For one thing, Carter acknowledges that in some situations people of different
religious persuasions will have nothing much more to say to each other than that
they disagree. For example, he says that regarding religious salvation, "[a]
Protestant has little choice but to say that a Catholic is just plain wrong in what

117. Id. at 3.

118.

CARTER,

supra note 30, at 42.

119. Id. at 61-62 (noting disagreements not only among Jews and Christians and Muslims, but also
among Christians themselves).
120. Id. at 62.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 63 (discussing President George W. Bush's possible belief that the leaders of Bob Jones
University had "misunderstood the Gospel").
123. Carter provides a few other hints about how he thinks civil public discourse ought to proceed in
his 1998 book, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY. For instance, he argues
that "criticism, even sharp criticism, is not uncivil," STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILrrY: MANNERS, MORALS,
AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY

109 (1998), but that personal attack is uncivil, id. at 124, and that we

must all listen civilly to the other side, even if we end up deciding that we were right all along. Id. at
138. He further contends that "[c]ivility requires that we express ourselves in ways that demonstrate our
respect for others," id. at 162, and that "[c]ivility allows criticism of others, and sometimes even
requires it, but the criticism should always be civil." Id. at 217. These suggestions provide further gloss
on Carter's argument in God's Name in Vain, but in neither book does Carter provide a satisfyingly full
account of how these very general principles will play out in any particular debate between a believer
and a nonbeliever over a matter of public concern so that the reader can get a full understanding of how
discourse in a religiously clothed public square will sound. Without this full understanding, it is difficult
to know whether this kind of public discourse is really something for which to strive.
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he believes ...and the Catholic has little choice but to reciprocate."1 24 He does
not pursue this idea to ask whether and how discourse over important issues
would actually be improved by having such discussions played out over and
over in the public arena. Is there truly nothing more the two people can say to
each other? If not, then why would this represent an improvement over a public
discourse in which people bracket their religious beliefs to try and find common
ground in public reason? Indeed, given that many believers would be outright
offended if presented with an argument that they ought to think differently
25
about a public issue because of the teachings of a different religion, 1 may a
religiously clothed public square be quite a bit more divisive than one governed
by public reason? Perhaps resort to religious arguments ought to be limited to
cases in which offense is unlikely, with public reason reserved for other
occasions. One wishes that Carter had given more sustained attention to what
religiously clothed debate would actually look like in practice, because without
such a description it is hard to evaluate whether this debate is indeed normatively desirable.
Moreover, Carter does not engage Rorty's critique in any serious way to
consider how a nonreligious person can respond to a religiously framed argument in the public square. Because Carter says that it is not wicked to describe
someone else's belief as false,126 it would seem to follow that it would be
perfectly acceptable for a nonreligious person (once he or she has afforded the
religious view "respect" and "honor") to reject a religious source of authority as
false or completely irrelevant to how that person views the issue. Carter does
warn against outright attack and urges citizens to "tread carefully" in their
debate, so presumably he would insist on a certain level of civility in the
dismissal of the religious argument, such that perhaps it would be unacceptable
for the nonbeliever to call the Bible "stupid" or "a joke," even if that is exactly
what the nonbeliever thinks.' 27 But these bare-bones principles are not well
fleshed out, and it is not always evident why Carter is objecting to certain
positions taken by nonreligious citizens.
Take the advertising example, for instance. It is not clear why exactly Carter
rejects the response of Madison Avenue that the Vatican should "stick to
religion." Is the problem that the response asserts some sort of procedural bar to
the argument, or is the problem one of civility (that the executive did not "tread
carefully" enough)? Or perhaps Carter is suggesting that the executive did not
"honor" and "respect" the religious viewpoint. What would the executive have
had to say before Carter would be satisfied that he or she had satisfied the
requirements of civil discourse?
But even if we accept (as I think we should) that something about the
124. CARTER, supra note 30, at 62.
125. Imagine, for instance, an orthodox Jew or devout Buddhist being directly told by a devout
Christian to think differently about a particular public issue because of something Jesus said or did.
126. CARTER, supra note 30, at 62.
127. This position is made clear by Carter's earlier work on civility. See supra note 123.
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executive's response was problematic, it is not altogether clear if Carter's new
public square would be much of an improvement over a public square that is
devoid of religious argument. Consider the following possible response from
the executive:
I understand that for many people the Bible and the Church are important
sources of moral authority, and that for them these sources suggest that the
advertising industry should follow certain ethical principles that it does not
currently follow. I respect your right to have this view and to express it in
public. However, I do not believe that the Bible or the Church has anything to
say to me about how I live my life. I have thought about religion for a long
time, and I have concluded that there is no God, that the Bible is just a
collection of stories that are completely meaningless to me, and that the
Church is an irrelevant institution filled with hypocrites and pedophiles. My
personal opinion is that people who believe in God are deceiving themselves
in an effort to find meaning in an otherwise meaningless universe. Thank you
very much, but I think I will continue to run my advertising agency as I wish.
In my view, this kind of response would probably be an appropriate way for a
nonreligious person to answer a religious argument in the public square. 128 The
response signifies that the responder respects the religious person's right to
invoke his religious opinion in the public square and that the responder has even
thought seriously about the religious issue himself. But is it really clear that a
discourse that invites such a response is preferable to a discourse that does not
include religious views in the first place? What is the religious person to say in
response to2 9the executive's statement? What, indeed, will either side do for an
"encore"?1 Perhaps the religious believer will engage the nonbeliever in his
disbelief. But will it really be better if atheists and believers engage in heated
argument over the existence of God and the authority of the Bible in conjunction with every public policy dispute? Will it help either believers or nonbelievers if nonbelievers are forced to articulate their rejection of religion in public?
May such a regime cause believers to feel more anger and nonbelievers to fear
more persecution than the current one? These are important questions because
they go to the issue of whether religiously clothed discourse, even if perfectly
democratic, legitimate, and American, is something that we really want in
128. 1 also think that such a response is probably consistent with Carter's principles of civility. See
supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text; supra note 123. Perhaps Carter would disagree on the
grounds that the responder does not seem to be open to persuasion from the believer (although the fact
that the responder says "I think I will continue to run my advertising agency as I wish" is purposely
included to cut against this argument). But if the responder has seriously considered the religious
perspective already, as the passage suggests, does civility demand that he continue to be as open as ever
to that perspective and to be ready to entertain endless arguments on behalf of that perspective? I do not
see any clear answer to this question in Carter's work. The question demonstrates that there is further
work to be done on the issue of how a nonbeliever may respond to religious arguments in the public
square.
129. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (quoting Richard Rorty).
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practice. It may be unfair and un-American to craft a procedural bar to religious
arguments in the public square, but that does not necessarily mean that lifting
the bar will result in a public discourse that is substantively any better than the
one we have now. Carter's failure to address these issues in any sustained
fashion weakens his argument.
II.

FRAMING THE SQUARE

Although Carter certainly advances some strong arguments in favor of allowing religious arguments into the public square, his presentation is unlikely to
move the debate over religion's proper role in public life forward in any
significant way because, in too large a part, he is speaking to those who already
agree with him. Carter's presentation is unlikely to be persuasive to those who
are naturally inclined to reject a larger role for religion in public discourse. As
explained in the Introduction to this Review, these resisters may include both
adherents of minority religious traditions who fear a public discourse in which
Christian voices would attack and overwhelm their own voices, as well as
nonbelievers who hold secular comprehensive views that they fear would lose
out in a religiously clothed public square. Although the problems are similar
with respect to each of these two groups, there are differences that warrant
treating them separately.
A. MINORITY RELIGIONS

As Diana Eck eloquently describes in her recent work, A New Religious
America: How a "Christian Country" Has Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation, the past three decades have witnessed an unprecedented
flourishing of religious pluralism in the United States, a pluralism unequaled in
any other region of the world:
Immigrants around the world number over 130 million, with about 30 million in the
United States, a million arriving each year. The dynamic global image of our times
is not the so-called clash of civilizations but the marbling of civilizations and
peoples. Just as the end of the Cold War brought about a new geopolitical situation,
the global movements of people have brought about a new georeligious reality.
Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims are now part of the religious landscape of Britain,
mosques appear in Paris and Lyons, Buddhist temples in Toronto, and Sikh gurdwaras in Vancouver. But nowhere, even in today's world of mass migrations, is the
sheer range of religious faith as wide as it is today in the United States. Add to
India's wide range of religions those of China, Latin America, and Africa. Take the
diversity of Britain or Canada, and add to it the crescendo of Latino immigration
along with the Vietnamese, Cambodians,30and Filipinos. This is an astonishing new
reality. We have never been here before.'

130. ECK, supra note 20, at 4-5.
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In addition to the phenomenon Eck describes, in which well-established
religions from other parts of the world have begun to put down roots in
America, a second phenomenon has further added to religious pluralism here
and elsewhere-the radical increase in new religious movements worldwide,
either as offshoots from established religions or religions that have arisen sui
generis. As Toby Lester reports in a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly, two
or three new religions appear on the face of the globe every single day.' 3, These
new religions, whose variety Lester describes as "astonishing and widely
unrecognized in the West,"' 132 include such new groups as the Ahmadis, a
"messianic Muslim sect based in Pakistan, with perhaps eight million members
in seventy countries"; Cao Dai, a religion based in Vietnam that combines
elements of Judaism, Confucianism, and Taoism; and the Raellians, an international UFO-based religious movement prominent in Quebec and Japan, which
was founded by a French race-car journalist.13 3 Although these new religions
have developed around the world, their presence is surely being felt in the
United States,' 34 and they have added to the extraordinary religious diversity
found in this country.
Despite this religious pluralism, however, it remains true that an overwhelming majority of Americans describe themselves as Christians of some sort.' 35 In
light of this fact, it would make sense that at least part of the resistance to a
religiously clothed public square that Carter describes stems from the fear of
many members of minority religious traditions that a religiously clothed public
square would be dominated by Christian discourse, symbols, ethics, and scripture. As Suzanna Sherry put it: "[I1n America, in actuality, allowing religious
reasons to justify public policy will have a negative effect on minorities,
especially Jews. The idea of favoring religion in general over non-religion is a
chimera, because in America, such a policy will always have the effect of
favoring Christianity over other religions."' 36 Many of those who fear a Christiandominated public square would unsurprisingly favor a public square in which
people at least attempted to frame their arguments and conclusions in language
that everyone could access and understand-a public square, in other words,
governed by public reason.
But, of course, there is a third alternative to either a Christian public square
or a purely secular public square that is at least theoretically possible-a public
square populated by all types of religious voices, from Christian to Jewish to

131. See Toby Lester, Oh, Gods!, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 37, 38 (quoting David B.
Barrett, editor of the World Christian Encyclopedia, a publication tracking worldwide religious
diversity).
132. Id. at 39.
133. Id. at 39-40.
134. See id. at 45 (describing the spread of new African and Latin American religious movements to
Europe and North America).
135. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
136. Sherry, supra note 1, at 502.
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Buddhist to Sikh to Raellianian and beyond. I strongly suspect that this is the
type of public square that Carter supports. This vision of a thoroughly inclusive
public square may or may not be attainable in practice, but to win over his
doubters, Carter must at least establish its attractiveness in theory. The problem
with God's Name in Vain, in my view, is that Carter does not accomplish this
task. He neither explicitly addresses the fear of minority believers that their
voices will be attacked and overwhelmed in a Christian public square nor
affirmatively describes a public square that includes their voices.
First, Carter does not directly take on the problem anywhere in the book. This
is somewhat inexplicable, given the importance of the issue. Carter's invocation
of the four so-called "clunkers"' 137 gives the reader the impression that he has
considered all of the possible objections to allowing a broader role for religion
in the public square, but this simply turns out not to be the case. Carter never
explains why, for example, orthodox Jews or Hindus, who fear being told that
they should support a particular policy position because of what Jesus said or
did, should put aside their worries. Those members of minority religious
communities reading God's Name in Vain and waiting for Carter to address their
concerns will find little if anything to soothe their anxiety that a public square
open to religious reasons will turn out to be an essentially Christian public
square. By side-stepping this critical issue, Carter fails to address the objections
to a clothed public square in a comprehensive and fully persuasive manner.
Carter does obliquely get at the issue by emphasizing that Christians do not
all hold the same views on issues of public concern. He writes,
More than four out of five Americans call themselves Christians, but they do
not all profess the same things, and sometimes the differences are vast. If
Christianity is dominant, there should be a single, clear Christian38view on
such divisive issues as abortion or same-sex marriage. There is not.
The notion that Christianity is far from a unitary world view is important to
understand, 139 and Carter's explanation of this is one of the strongest examples
of how he successfully educates his readership on the nature of religious
belief. 4 0 Nonetheless, this point does not dispel objections that a public square
open to religion will inevitably be a public square clothed with Christianity.
For one thing, the size of any particular Christian group holding any particular position on a public issue, though certainly smaller than eighty percent of the
nation's population, will nonetheless likely be far larger than any other particu-

137. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
138. CARTER, supra note 30, at 190; see also id. at 62-63 (describing differences among Christians).
139. See ECK, supra note 20, at 44-45; see also Yonat Shimron, Alliance Takes on Religious Right,
NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 17, 1996, at B 1 (describing development of the Interfaith Alliance, a national
coalition of Christians, as well as Jews, of various churches that oppose the conservative policy
positions of the Christian right).
140. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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lar tradition. The tiny percentage of the population who describe themselves as
Shintoists' 4 ' will probably feel as outnumbered by the one million supporters of
the Christian Coalition as they would if the Coalition were several times
larger.14 2 But probably more important, even if Christians differ on their
interpretation of Christian scripture and other sources of authority, and even if
they reach widely varying conclusions on divisive public issues, they still rely
on many of the same texts, stories, and symbols in forming those conclusions. It
will be little solace to a Taoist or a Hindu or a Jew who is surrounded by public
debate over the meaning of a particular aspect of Jesus's life that different
Christians reach different conclusions regarding that meaning. Those who fear a
Christian-dominated public square do not simply fear the conclusions that will
be reached in the square but also how discourse in the square will sound-what
types of arguments are made, what sources are relied upon, what authority will
be considered relevant. What can a Taoist bring to a debate over the proper
meaning of the Gospel of Mark? What can a Shintoist say about the meaning of
Jesus's resurrection? If these are the questions that will be debated in the
clothed public square, the Taoist and the Shintoist and the Hindu will not
necessarily find such a square more inviting just because Christians may differ
among themselves regarding the answers.
Second, even though Carter may believe that the public square should be
populated with all sorts of religious voices, the square he actually describes
in God's Name in Vain does not include this wide range of voices. The
examples Carter relies on and the possibilities he imagines are almost all
drawn from the Christian tradition. It is true that Carter urges members of all
religions to fight for religious freedom generally so that all religious believers are free to follow their consciences, 1 43 and he does occasionally mention
some aspect of a non-Christian faith. 14 4 But these references are slight and
intermittent. They cannot overcome the impression one gets from reading
the book that the religiously clothed public square is essentially a Christian
one.
The examples that Carter gives to support a public square open to religious
views are all grounded in Christianity. The two central historical narratives he

141. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
142. See Christian Coalition, Message of the Founder, at www.cc.org/aboutcca/patmessagel.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
143. CARTER, supra note 30, at 158 ("One subject around which all the religious should be able to
unite is the near-absolute right of every other religion to worship and follow its own God.").
144. See, e.g., id. at 29 (noting that the "very idea that God's will is both different from and higher
than the will of fellow humans ... is one of the signal contributions of Judaism to civilization"); id. at
62 ("Jews believe that Christians are wrong in thinking Jesus to be the Messiah and Christians and Jews
both believe that Muslims are wrong in thinking Muhammad the messenger of God."); id. at 150
(discussing Jehovah's Witnesses); id. at 151 (mentioning Midrash teaching); id. at 158 (noting that most
Eastern religions "abhor coercion and violence"); id. at 177 (discussing the Supreme Court case
involving the Old Order Amish). See also id. at 117-18 (describing the views of Socrates on the virtues
of reflection).
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invokes-the abolitionist movement of the mid-nineteenth century and the
civil-rights movement of the mid-twentieth century-were both rooted in Christian thought and driven by Christian leaders. The central parable that illustrates
the unbending nature of true religious belief-the Fannie Hamer example in the
second chapter-is based entirely in Christian thought. 45 The central metaphor
Carter invokes-the garden and the wilderness-is from Roger Williams, a
Baptist. The two primary examples of elites' hostility toward religion in the
public square-the advertising example and the lottery example-both concern
Christian viewpoints. In Carter's view, it was a "grand time to be a religious
American" when a pastoral letter from the Catholic bishops instigated a public
discussion over nuclear deterrence that involved a public discussion of Christian
ideas. 146 The vision Carter has that makes him exclaim "[w]hat a lovely world
this would be"147-a vision of the world in which a President could publicly
disagree with a Christian institution's interpretation of the Gospel-is one in
which public officials disagree over the meaning of Christian texts. And there
are plenty of other references to Christianity as well. 148 Unlike Carter's brief
and sporadic mentions of other religious traditions, his use of Christian 49
stories
1
book.
the
dominate
They
central.
and
sustained,
constant,
is
and symbols
It may be objected here that because Carter's normative argument is based in
large part on his reading of American history, it should be unsurprising that he
bases most of his argument on Christian sources and ideas, given that Christianity has been the dominant religion in America since the very beginning of the
nation's modern history.' 5 0 To some extent this is a fair point, and nothing I
have said here should be read to suggest that Carter was wrong to include the
Christian perspective, even a significant amount of that perspective, in his work.
No account of religious history in America would be complete without a
discussion of the Christian influence on abolitionism and civil rights, for
example. But at least four points militate against this objection as being
dispositive.
First, Carter's project of persuasion requires a disproportional emphasis on
minorities. For Carter to succeed in persuading members of minority religious
traditions to accept a religiously clothed public square, he has to explain

145. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
146. CARTER, supra note 30, at 136.
147. Id. at 63.
148. See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting the position of Pope John Paul II on religion and reason); id. at 45
(describing the political positions of conservative Christians); id. at 53-55 (describing Christian
Coalition alliance with Republican Party); id. at 115 (explaining that the Christian life should be about
"living in a way that Christ's light shines forth"); id. at 120 (describing various Christian boycotts); id.
at 185 (lamenting that in America today, many Christian traditions are politically identifiable).
149. Even the central examples of the potentially corrupting nature of politics on religion-the
corruption of the black clergy and the Christian Coalition-are drawn from the Christian tradition. See
supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
150. Of course, Native American religious beliefs and practices existed long before the arrival of
foreign religions.
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specifically why those minorities should be unafraid of such a square. To do
that, he must emphasize, beyond what a proportional account may look like,
that such a public square would affirmatively include minority voices. Thus,
even if one were to posit that Christianity has historically occupied ninety-five
percent of the modem American religious landscape, it would have behooved
Carter to devote far more than five percent of his discussion to non-Christian
arguments.
Second, even though Christianity in its various manifestations has played a
dominant role in modem American history, other traditions also have participated in the development of liberal public policy in the United States in ways
similar to the contributions of Christianity to the abolition and civil rights
movements. For example, Carter might have opened up his discussion a bit by
giving some attention to the important Jewish thinker and political activist
Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, who devoted much of his later life to fighting
for such liberal causes as the opposition to the Vietnam War, rights for the
15
elderly, freedom for Jews in Russia, and the civil rights movement itself. '
With respect to the latter, Heschel marched with the Reverend Martin Luther
King in Selma, Alabama, and was publicly recognized by King for his contributions to the movement.' 52 Or Carter could have pointed to modem-day activists
like Rabbi David Saperstein, whose Religious Action Center for Reform Judaism in Washington, D.C. continues to advocate progressive social policy in
environmental and
areas as diverse as welfare benefits, campaign finance,
15 3
criminal justice, civil rights, and international relations.
Third, to the extent that Carter wants to show generally that, as an empirical
matter, religion can be a force for liberalization and liberation when it plays a
role in the development of public policy, he certainly could have drawn on other
religious traditions in other areas of the world. One example that comes to mind
is the so-called "Engaged Buddhism" movement that originated in the 1950s
and 1960s, which has since played a prominent role in promoting various forms
of peace and liberation around the globe. Engaged Buddhists, among other
things, have fought for the liberation of the Tibetan people, promoted the liberty
and equality of oppressed classes in India, fought against rural poverty in Sri
Lanka, and responded to the various forms of damage brought by the war in
Vietnam. 154 And this movement has spread recently to Western countries, where
its political activism, according to one prominent scholar, has encompassed
151. See, e.g., EDWARD K. KAPLAN & SAMUEL H. DRESNER, ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL: PROPHETIC
WITNESS viii (1998); BYRON L. SHERWIN, ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL 5-7 (1979); Samuel H. Dresner,
Heschel the Man, in ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL: EXPLORING His LIFE AND THOUGHT 3, 5-12 (John C.
Merkle ed., 1985).
152. Dresner, supra note 151, at 8.
153. See the Religious Action Center's website at www.rac.org (last visited on March 9, 2002).
Carter could have also pointed to the contributions of "Engaged Buddhism" to liberal social policy in
the West. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
154. See Christopher S. Queen, Introduction:A New Buddhism, in ENGAGED BUDDHISM IN THE WEST
1, 4 (Christopher S. Queen ed., 2000).
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"nearly every area of social experience, conflict, and suffering: war and violence, race, human rights, environmental destruction, gender relations,15 5sexual
orientation, ethnicity, health care, prisons, schools, and the workplace."
Finally, not all of Carter's points are historical, and thus easily could have
been illustrated by reference to non-Christian faiths. Carter's description of the
nature of religious belief as essentially comprehensive, fundamental, and involuntary could have been illustrated by discussing the life stories of any number
of non-Christian religious figures. Instead of relying solely on the example of
Fannie Hamer, Carter also may have illustrated his point about religion's power
by describing Sioux holy man Black Elk,' 56 Zen master D.T. Suzuki,' 57 or
Hindu leader Mahatma Gandhi.' 58 Moreover, Carter could have used nonChristian examples to illustrate his point about the helpful perspectives that
religious discourse can offer on important public issues. For example, although
Carter is probably right that attention to Christian just-war doctrine could
illuminate our public discourse regarding all-important issues of war and peace,
religious views on the proper role of force are by no means limited to Christian
reflection. In fact, one can find rich perspectives on the issue in the ethical
writings of a variety of religious faiths. According to one scholar,
Historical and anthropological evidence suggests that every human culture
has generated some analogue of just-war tradition: a consensus of beliefs,
attitudes, and behavior that defines the terms of justification for resort to
violence and the limits, if any, to be set on the use of violence by members of
that culture. 159
It is unfortunate that Carter does not incorporate any of these non-Christian
155. Id. at 5.
156. See generally JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS: BEING THE LIFE STORY OF A HOLY MAN OF
THE OGLALA SIOUX (1932).
157. See generally IRWIN A. SWITZER III, D.T. SUZUKI: A BIOGRAPHY (1985).
158. See, e.g., Arun Gandhi, Who Influenced Gandhi?, in NONVIOLENCE FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM:
ITS LEGACY AND FUTURE 3 (G. Simon Harak ed., 2000) (recounting stories of Gandhi's religious
commitment); Graeme MacQueen, Gandhi and the Origins of Nonviolence: Edwin Arnold's The Light
of Asia, in NONVIOLENCE FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM: ITS LEGACY AND FUTURE, supra, at 24 (recounting
stories of Gandhi's fascination with the story of the Buddha during his youth).
159. James Turner Johnson, Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western
Culture, in JUST WAR AND JIHAD: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE IN
WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 3 (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson eds., 1991); see also JOHN
FERGUSON, WAR AND PEACE INTHE WORLD'S RELIGIONS passim (1978) (discussing religious views on war
within a wide range of world religions, including Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, and religions of the Far
East); HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR?: WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC AND
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-20 (2001) (discussing theories of permissible warfare within Islam);
Tessa Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka, 6 J. BUDDHIST
ETHICS 1, 1-2 (1999) (arguing for a "type of Buddhist 'just-war thinking' that calls into question
scholarly obedience to the canon's narratives of pacifism"); John Kelsay, The Just War Tradition and
the Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence, 2 INT'L. J. UNITY OF SCIENCES 229 (1989) (noting that "just war
criteria, while historically connected with Christian moral thinking, are nevertheless not strictly
Christian").
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views of war and peace into his discussion of the role that just-war
theory could
60
play in public discourse concerning American military policy.'
And one final point on Carter's treatment of minority religions: There is one
passage in the book that is quite startling in its characterization of non-JudeoChristian religions. Toward the end of the book, when Carter discusses religion's ability to resist the dominant meanings of the state, he says:
When religion presses back against the dominant culture, both are changed as
a result of the encounter. One reason that the culture changes may be that we
are constructed in a way that causes our souls to resonate to religious
language, even when we prefer to avoid it. The spirituality of religion, for
most Americans, fills a hole in the human soul that the more material aspects
of our world leave agape. Of the theistic religions this is particularly true, but
a nontheistic faith, such as the more refined forms of Buddhism, can play the
same role. 161
It is entirely unclear to me why Carter would distinguish between theistic
faiths and nontheistic faiths with regard to how they may satisfy the human
quest for spirituality. Nor can I understand what Carter means when he distinguishes between "refined" and (presumably) "unrefined" forms of Buddhism.
Perhaps there are defensible reasons for these distinctions (though Carter does
not really provide any), but as it stands, this seemingly offhanded remark is
likely to offend Buddhists of all varieties around the world, as well as those who
believe in other nontheistic faiths, many of whom live in the United States. The
comment surely goes directly against the project of persuasion that Carter must
complete if he really wants his work to lead to a public square more tolerant and
inclusive of all religious faiths.
B.

COMPREHENSIVE SECULAR VIEWS

Although data show that most Americans describe themselves as members of
some religious tradition, 162 a significant number-as high as eight percent by
one account-describe themselves as nonbelievers, 63 either as agnostics, as
"humanists," or simply as having "no religion."' 64 Moreover, it is surely the
case that some percentage (perhaps a large percentage) of those who describe
themselves as belonging to a religious tradition do not believe strongly and do

160. In the pages just preceding Carter's discussion of just-war theory, he does lament that the
"nation's religions" have not critically examined recent American use of force, CARTER, supra note 30,
at 126-27, and he does briefly discuss Jewish philosopher Martin Buber's thought, id. at 129, but in his
actual discussion of just-war theory, he discusses only Christian theories. Id. at 132-36.
161. Id. at 172.
162. See KosMtN & LACHMAN, supra note 21, at 3 (showing that in 1990, 89.5% of those surveyed
described themselves as members of some religion).
163. Id. (8.2% described themselves as nonreligious).
164. Id. at 17 (7.5% said they have "no religion"; 0.7% described themselves as "agnostic"; less than
0.1% described themselves as "humanist").
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not draw on their religious beliefs as a primary source of their thinking on
issues of public concern. 165 It is also perhaps the case, as Carter suggests, that a
disproportionate number of the so-called elites, who possess a disproportionate
amount of the wealth, influence, and power
in American society, describe
66
themselves as nonreligious in some way. 1
It should come as no surprise if a great many of these nonreligious elites (and
nonreligious nonelites, for that matter) would want to exclude religiously
clothed discourse from the public square. Those who do not think or talk about
public issues in religious terms or language are quite likely to feel that such
language excludes them from full participation in public debate and renders
them outsiders in the political process. 167 In light of this important concern, and
particularly given that (at least in Carter's view) those with a disproportionately
significant amount of influence in American public life are likely to hold this
concern, 168 one would expect Carter to take great pains to convince the nonreligious elites that the fear of exclusion is not in fact a concern they should be
particularly worried about.
Regrettably, Carter does not expend significant effort in this direction. To be
sure, some of his arguments are likely to have some impact on nonbelievers
who are hostile to an increased role for religion in public life. For example, his
description of religious belief as all-encompassing and to some extent involuntary should cause opponents to reconsider the view (if they indeed hold such a
view) that religious believers can easily bracket their beliefs when thinking and
talking about matters of public concern. Likewise, his account of American
Christianity's historical support for liberating social movements should cause
those who think that religion's influence on social policy is inevitably reactionary to reconsider that assumption. Nevertheless, Carter never specifically acknowledges with any sort of empathy the serious concerns that nonbelievers
have about a public square suffused with religion. His strategy concerning those
who disagree with him is not to ease their worries but to belittle them,' 69 and
this is not a strategy that is likely to win many converts.
Carter's treatment (or nontreatment) of the issue is particularly unfortunate
because he might have persuaded some skeptics by framing his public square
broadly enough to include certain categories of nonbelievers. 170 The two impor-

165. See id. at 9 (noting that only 58% of Americans claimed that they considered religion "very
important").
166. See CARTER, supra note 30, at 4 (observing that political, legal, and media elites are the ones
who primarily think that religion does "more harm than good").
167. See Greene, Is Religion Special?, supra note 1, at 1619-24.
168. I infer this belief from Carter's position that opposition to religious arguments in the public
square comes disproportionately from elites, whom I assume are those with the most influence in
American political and public life.
169. Carter's use of the term "clunkers" to describe possible objections to his position is emblematic
of this strategy. CARTER, supra note 30, at 20-22.
170. It is surely the case that there are some categories of nonbelievers that Carter would be unlikely
to persuade no matter how broadly he framed the public square. For instance, Carter probably could not
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tant types of nonbelievers whom Carter could have persuaded, and who should
be included in any public square that is truly hospitable to a diverse variety of
views on the human good, are (1) those who believe in comprehensive secular
views of the good life that they would like to invoke in public debate if only
they felt it were appropriate to do so; and (2) those who do not currently believe
in any comprehensive view of the good life, but who (a) possess policy
preferences that are at odds with those held by religious believers and (b) would
be willing to develop comprehensive but secular views of the good life that they
could invoke in the public square to oppose the policy preferences of those
religious believers.
As to the first group, it is probably the case that at least a few of the
nonreligious elites that Carter needs to persuade hold views of the good life
that-at least to some degree-play the same comprehensive and fundamental
role in their lives that religious beliefs play in the lives of religious believers.
For instance, some may believe very strongly that the pursuit of pleasure in
some form ought to be a prominent element of the good life. While people may
hold these views in a considerably more inchoate fashion than the way that
people hold religious views, in large part because they are not currently
associated with any prominent organizational structure and do not have the
7
same kind of social history that religious traditions generally do,' ' nonreligious
views of this sort may still function in much the same manner as religious
views. These nonreligious worldviews may serve the equivalent function as
religious views because they may be very strongly held and affect how the
believer approaches all of his or her life. Moreover, because these kinds of
secular views of the good life can function much the same way that religious
debate by
beliefs function, they would likely be viewed as off-limits in public
72
anyone who believes in a Rawlsian conception of public reason.'
Thus, to the extent Carter wanted to persuade skeptics that they should
support a public square friendly to religion, he might have been more successful
if he had explicitly indicated that such a public square would also be friendly to

have persuaded, no matter what he said, those nonbelievers who are truly hostile to religion, or those
who deeply feel that reliance on comprehensive views in the public square is appropriate so long as
those comprehensive views are not religious ones, or those who are unswervingly committed to the
ideal of public reason.
171. In other words, the claim is not that there are significant numbers of people who would describe
themselves as "Neo-Epicureans" or "Kantian Liberals" or "Benthamite Utilitarians," but rather that
there are people that believe very strongly in a moral system that, though perhaps unnamed, nonetheless
closely resembles a kind of Epicureanism or Kantian liberalism or Bentham-style utilitarianism.
172. By believers in a Rawlsian conception I mean to refer not only to someone who explicitly relies
on Rawls's argument for public reason, or even to someone who has actually read Rawls. I refer here to
anyone who feels it would be inappropriate or just weird to say in public debate (even though they
strongly believe in the correctness of the statements) something like: "We ought to make public policy
choices that will make it easier for human beings to experience pleasure because the basic purpose of
human life is to pursue pleasure," or even, "We ought to follow the teachings of Immanuel Kant and
make public policy choices based on the assumption that human beings should not use other human
beings as means, but only as ends in themselves."
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comprehensive, but secular, views of the good life. 17 3 By taking this approach,
he might have persuaded those who would like to invoke explicitly their
comprehensive but secular beliefs in the public square, but who currently feel
that it would be inappropriate to do so. Concededly, it is by no means clear how
many people both hold these kinds of comprehensive secular views of the good
and also feel, at least subconsciously, on Rawlsian-type grounds, that reliance
on these kinds of views in public limits is inappropriate. In my view, however,
there probably are some people who do so, and in some instances they may very
well be exactly the elites that Carter needs to persuade.
As to the second group, it is probably the case that there are a large number
of nonbelievers in the United States who do not adhere to any comprehensive
view of the good life but who oppose allowing religious arguments into the
public square because they disagree substantively with the policy preferences
supported by conservative religious believers.174 For example, it is likely that
many nonbelievers would resist an increased role for religion in the public
square because they oppose the positions that conservative Christians, Jews, and
others take on issues such as abortion, sexuality, and family values. Certainly,
many of these nonbelievers will resolutely think, regardless of what arguments
are made to them, that religion should be banished from the public square,
leaving only so-called publicly accessible arguments. But there may be some
portion of these nonbelievers who would be persuaded by an argument as
follows: (1) The public square will inevitably include religiously based arguments, and these arguments are likely to become more frequent and prominent;
(2) the policy preferences that result from those religious arguments are unlikely
to be countered successfully by arguments made with public reason because
those sorts of arguments do not address the same fundamental questions that are
addressed by religious arguments; (3) but policy preferences based in religious
reasoning potentially can be countered by advocating contrary policy preferences based on their own comprehensive but secular worldviews because these
kinds of secular worldviews work on the same level as religious beliefs; (4) a
public square that welcomes religious argumentation would also welcome
argumentation based in comprehensive secular worldviews, and this is perfectly
appropriate; (5) so, instead of opposing a public square that welcomes religion,
support a public square that welcomes all comprehensive worldviews, and feel
free to develop comprehensive but secular views that lead to the policy out-

173. 1 do not mean necessarily to say that religious and comprehensive nonreligious views are on all
fours epistemologically, see generally Alexander, supra note 8, or that there are no important distinctions between them, but it is hard to see why, as a result of any such distinction, the public square
should be welcoming to religious views but hostile to secular comprehensive ones.
174. It is also certainly possible that there are some nonbelievers who hold relatively conservative
policy preferences that are at odds with the policy preferences held by liberal religious believers and
who may be willing to develop comprehensive but secular views of the good life that that the could
invoke in the public square to oppose the policy preferences of those liberal religious believers.
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comes you prefer.' 7 5
In my view, this argument is an important one at this stage in the development of the religiously clothed public square. Those who disagree with the
policy preferences of conservative religious believers are in a difficult position.
If religious arguments are going to play an increasingly larger role in the public
square, as it appears they may, opponents of those policy preferences are going
to have a difficult time winning arguments solely by resorting to publicly
accessible arguments that do not rely on any fundamental conception of the
good life. Moreover, although there are certainly (as Carter points out) religious
believers who themselves disagree with these conservative policy preferences
(for example, liberal Christians and Jews who support abortion rights), those
who support liberal policies but do not believe in any religion should not have
to rely solely on the voices of religious believers who share their policy
preferences to supply their own voices on these policy issues. It will therefore
become increasingly important for these liberal nonbelievers1 76 to develop,
organize, and systematize secular comprehensive views of the good life that
support liberal policy preferences in a form that makes those preferences easy to
invoke in the public square to counter religious views with which they disagree
in a serious and sustained manner.
For example, one may imagine the creation and development of a "NeoEpicurean" movement formed by those who think that a primary goal of human
life should be to pursue pleasure in some form. This movement could create a
deeply theorized but also socially and politically active organization that puts
forward its substantive beliefs on the good life in the public square to counter
conservative religious views on the regulation of sexuality.1 77 But whatever

175. The goal here for the nonbeliever primarily would be to develop such views and arguments to
persuade those who have not yet made up their minds, rather than to convince those who firmly hold
the opposite policy preferences based on their religious beliefs. Otherwise we simply have the
replication of the problem described earlier, in which the Protestant and the Catholic have nothing to
say to each other. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25. The question of to whom religious
arguments (and other comprehensive views) ought to be directed is an important one that has not, in my
view, been sufficiently explored in the literature. It is one thing to try and convince an orthodox Jew
that she ought to take a particular policy position because of something Jesus said or did, and quite
another to aim that argument at someone who has no strong religious position. The former may be
considered more offensive than the latter, as well as being less likely to succeed. The same audience
related concern would necessarily apply to the articulation of comprehensive secular arguments.
176. The category within which, in full disclosure, I place myself.
177. By using the term "Epicurean," I of course do not mean to imply that Epicurus or his followers
would themselves have taken policy positions that are contrary to those currently espoused by
conservative Christians. The point is simply that it may be possible to develop a comprehensive secular
position (what I call "Neo-Epicureanism") based on the Epicurean insight that the pursuit of pleasure in
some form ought to be an integral element of the good life. See EPICURUS, LE~rERS, PRINCIPAL
DocTRINES, AND VATICAN SAYINGS 56 (Russel M. Geer trans., 1964) ("We recognize pleasure as the first
and natural good; starting from pleasure we accept or reject; and we return to this as we judge every
good thing, trusting this feeling of pleasure as our guide."); id. at 57 ("When we say that pleasure is the
end, we do not mean the pleasure of the profligate or that which depends on physical enjoyment.., but
by pleasure we mean the state wherein the body is free from pain and the mind from anxiety.").
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form this resistance may take, the development of these nonreligious movements and organizations will become more and more necessary as the view that
the public square should be open to religious argument gains greater currency. If
such movements and organizations do develop, this development will likely
proceed according to one of two general models. Either the organizations will
develop late, reluctantly, and bitterly in response to a public square that has
become more and more religious, or they could be explicitly invited in the first
instance by those, like Carter, who argue for a more religiously inclusive public
square. The latter option is clearly preferable because it would have a better
chance of creating a public square governed by trust and civic peace as opposed
to hostility, resentment, and overall unpleasantness.
Carter could have framed his public square broadly enough explicitly to
include nonbelievers, either those who hold secular comprehensive views of the
good life or those who would be willing to develop such views, but he chose not
to do so. Moreover, not only does Carter fail to include secular views of the
good life in his public square, but he is also often hostile to views if the world
not based in religious belief. Although it is not exactly clear whether Carter's
main complaint is that public discourse is dominated by nonsubstantive and
therefore pointless rights-talk or whether instead it is dominated by substantive
nonreligious views of the good life that turn out to be vapid, it is abundantly
clear that Carter thinks that a public life without religion is empty and morally
dangerous.
Carter consistently suggests that only religion can save America and Americans from moral bankruptcy, indicating that nonreligious views of the good life
cannot do the same thing. He says, for example, that the religious voice is
''perhaps the only remaining force that can call us to something higher and
better than thinking constantly about our own selves,"1 78 that "[p]olitics without
religion must necessarily be, in today's America, the politics of me,"' 1 7 9 and that
a "politics without religion is empty of meaning."' 80 He says that a "democracy
that lacks the moral force of religious understanding is likely to be a democracy
without purpose, ' that "[m]orality ...is but spirituality in action,"' 18z and
that "without the religious voice, our politics will be nothing-which means, in
a democracy, that our nation will be nothing.' ' 83 No role is given to nonreligious views of the good life to save our morality, our politics, or our nation.
Carter is entitled to these views on the primacy of religious belief, and as a
participant in public debates over the future of America it is completely
appropriate for him to voice these views. But God's Name in Vain is trying to do
more, it would seem, than serve as a vehicle for Carter's personal views on the
178.
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good life. The book also is trying to appeal to elites to make a procedural shift
to allow religion and religiously clothed discourse into the public square.' 8 4 To
the extent that this is one of Carter's purposes in writing God's Name in Vain,
his approach is counterproductive for this purpose. His veiled attacks on
nonreligious morality are guaranteed to alienate and perhaps offend nonbelievers and make them inhospitable to his many strong and otherwise persuasive
arguments. And, more broadly, by not including these nonreligious moral views
in his vision of the public square, Carter misses an important chance to broaden
his argument explicitly to include nonbelievers.
CONCLUSION

For many years, Carter has been one of the most eloquent promoters of the
religious presence in the public square, and his contributions to the debate over
religion's proper role in public life are unsurpassed. Carter is obviously motivated by his passionate Christian beliefs, and these beliefs give his prose a
power rarely found in academic writing. Perhaps ironically, it would appear the
very strength of these beliefs makes it difficult for Carter to complete the final
step of his project-persuading nonbelievers and non-Christians to sign on fully
to his vision of the religiously clothed public square. The only way to convince
those hostile to a public square suffused with religion is to take their concerns
seriously, and this requires that the writer place himself in the position of the
objectors to understand their very real worries about what a public square filled
with religious voices might sound like and how their own voices would sound
in such a square. Carter seems so convinced of his own position that he cannot
demonstrate such empathy. It may be possible to convince skeptics that a
religiously clothed public square is something to strive for, but it will not be
easy and Carter does not do it here. God's Name in Vain makes a strong and
convincing case that it is not inappropriate for believers to rely on their religion
in public, but the public square it frames ultimately is too narrow to be broadly
appealing.

184. See supra note 36.

